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Abstract Cyber security has become a major concern for
users and businesses alike. Cyberstalking and harassment
have been identified as a growing anti-social problem. Be-
sides detecting cyberstalking and harassment, there is the
need to gather digital evidence, often by the victim. To this
end, we provide an overview of and discuss relevant tech-
nological means, in particular coming from text analytics
as well as machine learning, that are capable to address the
above challenges. We present a framework for the detec-
tion of text-based cyberstalking and the role and challenges
of some core techniques such as author identification, text
classification and personalisation. We then discuss PAN,
a network and evaluation initiative that focusses on digital
text forensics, in particular author identification.
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1 Introduction
Personal threats, false accusations, privacy-violation and
defamation are typical forms of attacks faced by victims of
harassment and stalking. The advancement in Information
and Communication Technology (ICT) has extended exist-
ing attack vectors further to include many online social-
networks designed for people to interact using multime-
dia. Content forms such as text, images, audio and video
are utilised in the context of Human Computer Interac-
tion (HCI) methods to interface with end users. This is
usually enabled through web browsers, mobile applications
and other such means.
The significant impact of ICT on the severity of cyber-
stalking has been reported in the literature. For instance,
research from the Electronic Communication Harassment
Observation (ECHO) project [23, 31] shows that many in-
cidents, although initially emerging in cyberspace, have
consequently moved to the physical world. Extreme ex-
amples of such incidents have forced victims to disengage
from their daily routines, move homes, and/or change jobs
resulting in significant financial losses, inducing fear, dis-
tress, and disrupting the daily activities of victims. Accord-
ingly, terms such as cyberstalking and cyberbullying have
emerged to address the problem with full consideration of
the heavily interconnected Cyber-Physical-Natural (CPN)
world [18] to accurately define the ecosystem where both
victims and attackers practice all their life-related activities.
There is evidence that the extreme emotional distress and
physical trauma caused by these anti-social offences have
also led to suicide and murder [31].
It is important to elaborate on the unique characteris-
tics of cyberstalking; in this paper we define cyberstalking
messages to be: 1) unwanted or unwelcome; 2) sent from
a known or unknown but determined/motivated party (per-
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petrator); 3) intentionally communicated to target a specific
individual (the victim), and 4) persistent. The National Cen-
tre for Cyberstalking Research (NCCR)1, based in the UK,
further recognises the persistent behaviour to be realised
when ten or more unwanted messages are sent over a pe-
riod of time that is equal to or less than four weeks. Clearly,
this discussion sets a distinctive line between cyberstalking
and any discrete events of online harassing materials. To
effectively mitigate the risks associated with cyberstalking,
technology must be utilised to support detection, event clas-
sification, automated responses, and reporting of incidents.
Text analysis and Information Retrieval (IR) play a critical
role given that text (emails, SMS, instant messaging (IM),
Blog posts, Twitter tweets, etc.) is a popular content form
reportedly used in the vast majority of incidents.
In the remainder of this paper we elaborate further on the
need for technical solutions to tackle cyberstalking. After-
wards, in Sect. 3, we discuss a framework for cyberstalking
detection and evidence gathering; this also includes the ap-
plication of text analysis and machine learning in this con-
text. One of the main emerging challenges within technical
solutions is authorship identification. We therefore also in-
troduce a the PAN shared task series that tackles this task in
Sect. 4. It is one of the aims of this paper to relate this line
of research to the context of automatic solutions to detect
and handle cyberstalking in text messages.
2 Finding solutions to curtail cyber harassment
and cyberstalking
The importance of an adequate cyber crime response is
recognised to be a cross-cutting issue in cybersecurity and
law enforcement as it has clear links to serious organised
crime, protecting the vulnerable and victims of child sex-
ual exploitation [37]. The growth of the internet has led
to the traditional crimes of stalking and harassment being
transformed in scale and form. Much of the recent research
into cyberstalking has focussed on the comparisons between
offline stalking and cyberstalking and the mental health out-
comes of the victims of stalkers. Therefore, the necessity
to increase understanding of the technological means of de-
tecting and gathering evidence in cases of cyberstalking is
paramount.
Although there is no conclusive evidence as to the in-
creasing prevalence of cyberstalking on account of advance-
ments in technology, it can be assumed that the number
of cyberstalking incidents has indeed risen dramatically.
According to a report released by the UN’s International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) in 2013, approximately
39% of the world’s population now has access to the inter-
1 http://www.beds.ac.uk/nccr/.
net, which is equivalent to around 2.7 billion people. Online
resources can also be utilised unlawfully by criminals. For
instance, with regard to cyberstalking, criminals have an
infinite number of online users to stalk or harass.
From a broad perspective, the issues surrounding and
the consequences of acts such as cyberbullying, harass-
ment, and stalking are most certainly within the public’s
zeitgeist. For example, TV shows and films are increas-
ingly produced on this subject matter and not necessarily
from a fictional standpoint. However, realistic solutions
are rarely forthcoming beyond the required narrative clo-
sure. Legally, since cyberstalking is a criminal offence in
some countries, the system partially contributes to the so-
lution. For instance, in the UK, based on the circumstances
of a given case, relevant laws could include the Sexual
Offences Act 2003 S.15, Protection from Harassment Act
1997, Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and Domestic Vio-
lence, Crime and Victims Act 2004. Additionally, a number
of support services (e.g. The National Stalking Helpline)
provide the community with advice on how to report ha-
rassment, gather evidence and reduce risk. However, rel-
evant technologies have only been very briefly researched
to produce applicable solutions. Therefore, beyond advice
on best practice (for example see [25]) for those who find
themselves as the target of cyberstalking and the like novel
technical solutions are needed. These technical solutions
are needed not only from a prevention or evidenciary ba-
sis but also so that those who find themselves as the focus
of these types of attack can feel a sense of regaining con-
trol, loss of control being one of the many consequences as
reported by the ECHO project [23, 31].
Current literature includes proposals aiming to shield
unwanted communication; provide training and emotional
support through simulators; and facilitate incident reporting
and digital investigations [20]. As communication channels
are hard to control, current proposals in this area suggest
a layer of encryption and integrity checking to preserve
privacy and facilitate identity checking [10]. This will pre-
sumably prevent unwanted communication but the scenario
adopts a white-list approach where each connection is pre-
approved. This can be very efficient within a parental-con-
trolled environment to protect minors but not convenient
for adults with extensive online tasks to perform as part of
their career or social life. A good solution should ideally
empower users with real control over unwanted messages
without restricting their online reachability. Other exist-
ing methods utilise traditional techniques to restrict con-
tact (e.g. block IDs and mobile numbers); although attack-
ers in many stalking scenarios are known to the victims,
this approach still fails due to the high-degree of online
anonymity possible in cyberspace, for instance, perpetra-
tors can forge email headers, create new social media ac-
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counts, and hide their IP addresses via Privacy Enhancing
Technologies (PET) [16].
Reactive proposals are focused on incident response,
usually through digital investigation toolkits designed to
not only recover the attacker’s identity but to preserve an
admissible evidence to a court of law. Software such as
the Predator and Prey Alert (PAPA) system [2] enables re-
mote monitoring of local activities by the police to facili-
tate investigations and collect evidence; such solutions re-
quire an agent software to be installed at the end-user’s side
to be able to also monitor encrypted communications [4].
Clearly, this comes at a price in terms of user privacy but
could be effective in many extreme cases. In response to
online anonymity, authorship analysis can be performed to
establish hypotheses on which content belongs to which
user. Eventually, determining particular details such as the
age, gender or physical location from contextual clues can
help a system to automate a response (e.g., warning, block,
report) [3]. Nonetheless, content forms can sometimes be
directly linked to the originator, for instance pictures can
be associated with the particular camera it was taken by,
or to other images produced by the same camera. This has
been tested based on the analysis of Sensor Pattern Noise
(SPN), published results suggest a satisfactory outcome for
this technique [29].
An example of the other type of reactive responses
could be initiated through peer-support simulators, a vir-
tualised application to provide social services including
emotional comfort and standardised professional advice
to victims [39]. Likewise, proactive solutions could in-
clude training through simulators or by means of serious
games [8] to educate and raise awareness of the problem.
An important conclusion from these examples is that au-
tomated detection through machine learning and text anal-
ysis is a fundamental component to provide intelligence in
each case. Detection is known to be the first step to trigger
a suitable action and mitigate the incident; alert a supervi-
sor, block communication, and preserve evidence. As such,
this is currently an active research area at a very early stage
where data mining algorithms are trained, pre-processing
techniques tested, and new corpora are being built [14, 7,
9].
The prior techniques were discussed to demonstrate
a practical response. While their combination yields
a promising plan customised to mitigate cyberstalking,
the applicability of such implementations can also be ex-
tended to cover other forms of cybercrime. For instance,
the functionality of a mobile application designed to report
harassment could, in theory, be generalised to consider
blackmail, fraud and other anti-social behaviour. The
Crown Prosecution Service in the UK categorise crimi-
nal offences sent via social media into credible threats
that could constitute violence to the person or damage to
property; targeted attacks on individuals such as Revenge
Porn; communications which may amount to a breach of
a court order or a statutory prohibition, and finally, commu-
nications which are Grossly Offensive, Indecent, Obscene
or False [36]. Any digital evidence created using media
recorders could be shared with law enforcement using the
same process but using different methods. Likewise, any
empirical results on the feasibility of using simulated agents
in virtual reality to mitigate cyberstalking by means of train-
ing and social support, would trigger advancement in the
field to provide algorithms modelled to automated conver-
sations with people suffering depression, anxiety disorder,
or even eating disorders.
3 A framework for automatic cyberstalking
detection in texts
Having discussed the need for technical solutions to tackle
cyberstalking, we now turn to the question how different
text analysis, information retrieval, and machine learning
techniques could be utilised to detect potentially harmful
cyberstalking messages and to collect the required evidence
for law enforcement. To this end, we present in this section
a framework that outlines potential tasks and solutions as
well as their relationships. In this respect, author identi-
fication is one of the core tasks that undergoes increasing
popularity in the research community. We therefore con-
tinue our discussion in Sect. 4 where the PAN network on
digital text forensics is introduced, which combines differ-
ent research efforts in this field.
Our proposed framework is called Anti Cyberstalking
Text-based System (ACTS). The framework is a generalisa-
tion of the one proposed in [12] (from email to general
text messages), which is missing a personalisation mod-
ule motivated below. It is furthermore adapted from work
presented in [11]. The framework proposed here could
best be described as a detection and digital readiness sys-
tem, which specialises in an automatic detection and evi-
dence collection of text-based cyberstalking (e.g., in emails,
MMS, SMS, chat messages, tweets, social media updates,
instant messages). A prototypical implementation of the
framework is under development, and the data collection
process is ongoing. ACTS is designed with the aim to run
on a user’s computer/mobile device to detect and filter text-
based cyberstalking. The architecture of ACTS is depicted
in Fig. 1.
The proposed system combines several techniques to
mitigate cyberstalking. It consists of five main modules:
attacker identification, detection, personalisation, aggrega-
tor, and evidence collector.
When a new message arrives, metadata-based blacklists
may be applied to filter messages coming from unwanted
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Fig. 1 The ACTS framework. Different text analysis and machine learning modules, based on user profiles, content and writeprint/author
identification, are used to determine whether a text message is legitimate or unwanted
senders. Such metadata may for instance consist of the
header information in emails or the sender in tweets. How-
ever, some systems allow for forging such metadata, for
instance by providing a fake ‘sender’ header in emails or
using anonymous or fake accounts. For this reason, mes-
sages that pass the blacklist need to be further examined by
the identification, personalisation, and detection modules.
The results from three modules are passed to the aggrega-
tor for a final decision.
Similar to other email filtering systems (like spam detec-
tors), the detection module is employed to detect and clas-
sify messages into cyberstalking messages, genuine mes-
sages, and grey messages based on their (textual) content.
A number of supervised and unsupervised machine learning
algorithms can be employed to classify and filter unwanted
text messages [30]. To this end, we assume the detection
module computes a value β that covers the content-based
estimate of the system that the message is unwanted (for
instance, based on unwanted words or phrases). A chal-
lenging task is to take into account the nature of messages
from short SMS and chat messages to potentially longer
emails.
Unlike the detection module, the attacker identification
module analyses messages based on sender writeprints (in
an analogy to fingerprints); these are writing-style features
such as structural, lexical, syntactic, and content-specific
features [38]. Applying means for authorship attribution
and verification (further discussed in Sect. 4), this module
is deployed specifically to detect and uncover anonymous
and spoofed messages which are sent by a known attacker
who may not be detected based on metadata. Furthermore,
the evidence provided by the attacker identification module
helps classifying those messages which potentially could
bypass the detection module as they do not contain any un-
wanted words or phrases. However, authorship attribution
on short messages poses specific challenges for instance
due to the character limitation of short messages (e.g., SMS
is limited to 160 characters per message and similar lim-
itations hold for tweets). Nevertheless, because of their
character limitation, people tend to use unstandardised and
informal language abbreviations and other symbols, which
mostly depend on user’s choice, subject of discussion and
communities [13], where some of these abbreviations and
symbols could provide valuable information to identify the
sender. A possible solution to overcome this shortcoming
and to enhance the identification process is a combination
of cyberstalker’s writeprints with their profile, including lin-
guistic and behavioural profiles, utilising already collected
writeprints and profiles stored.
The result of the identification module is represented
by the value α, for instance, based on three outputs: not
cyberstalking (α ≥ r), cyberstalking (α ≤ r) and grey
(r < α < r). The α value is passed to the aggregator
component, r and r are pre-defined threshold values in
attacker identification (which have to be determined empir-
ically).
Cyberstalking and cyber-harassment are abusive and
threatening attacks; however, the concept of what is con-
sidered abusive and threatening in a message is a subjective
decision from a victim’s perspective; we have to take into
account that such a decision is a highly personalised one.
For example, bare words or phrases in a message might
have no inclination whatsoever towards bad feeling to
almost anyone, but they might cause fear and distress to
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a cyberstalking victim. For instance, sending child birth-
day wishes may commonly be considered as positive, but
not in case of somebody who lost their child or had un-
dergone abortion. This complicates the process of de-
veloping a general tool to combat text-based cyberstalk-
ing. For this reason we define a personalisation module
which is employed to enhance the overall victim’s con-
trol over incoming messages, where each victim can out-
line and define their own rule preferences. Therefore the
personalisation module may consist of rule based com-
ponents and a code dictionary. The rule based compo-
nent is optional, where rules are defined based on words,
dates and phrases provided by the user. For example,
a typical rule might be if ((dateA < currentdate < dateB) ∧
(message contains “happy birthday”)) return true. If cy-
berstalking involves ex-partners, the cyberstalker has back-
ground knowledge about victims and knows which words/
phrases at which specific times can cause distress and fear
to victims (in this case “happy birthday”). Furthermore,
consider the above example where somebody gets birthday
wishes for a lost child; they will likely occur around the
time of the actual birthday, hence specifying a time range
would make sense as a further means to personalised cy-
berstalking detection.
A code dictionary is created from ranked words and
phrases which are commonly used in cyberstalking. Fur-
thermore, the code dictionary could also be updated by the
user. The ranking value for each word and phrase is initially
set to zero. Then each time a word or phrase in a dictionary
is matched with words or phrases in received message, the
ranking value of the matched word/phrase in the code dic-
tionary is increased. Obviously, the most common words
or phrases will be ranked highest, and the messages first
matched with highest ranked words and phrases.
The received message could be preprocessed; for this
purpose k-shingling [6] could be utilised. Shingling is an-
other way to represent features (terms) of a message, which
has been used in email classification. A shingle of a mes-
sage is a sequence of all words in that message; the size k of
a shingle is the number of words in that shingle (denoted by
k-shingle). If a message m can be presented by a sequence
of words w ,w, ...,wn then k-shingling of m will result in
j features with j = (n − k) + , so each feature will cover
k terms. For example [6], if we select 4-shingling (k = )
and the message is “a rose is a rose is a rose”, the fea-
tures are based on (“a rose is a”), (“rose is a rose”), (“is
a rose is”), (“a rose is a”), (“rose is a rose”). Where each
k-length shingle is run against the dictionary, probabilistic
disambiguation [1] is another possible method to be used.
This is a probabilistic technique used to measure usage
violence and extremist hate effects on different online mes-
sages. Therefore, such technique could be used to measure
the degree of offensiveness and seriousness of cyberstalking
messages in relation to a dictionary code database.
Both the dictionary’s returned result and rule-based re-
sult are represented by the value λ, which may be for
instance either cyberstalking (1) or not cyberstalking (0)
(when both returned results are negative). The final de-
cision whether a received message is cyberstalking or not
is made in the aggregator module, utilising the outcome
from the previous modules. α, β and λ are the final cal-
culated result values for each individual received message
by the identification, personalisation, and detection mod-
ule, respectively. Messages are identified as either grey (?),
cyberstalking (1) or not cyberstalking (0) based on these
values. If messages are classified as grey, the respective
message may be flagged and the final decision should be
made by the user.
The final module is the evidence collection module,
which collects evidence from a newly arriving cyberstalk-
ing message, for instance, apart from the provided metadata
and content, in the case of email the source IP address or,
if it is not available, the next server relay in the path, and
the domain name (both addresses are automatically sub-
mitted to WHOIS and other IP geolocation websites). The
information with timestamp and email headers is saved, for
instance, in the evidence database on a victims’ device. The
module should also regularly update and add stylometric
profiles and related information of the cyberstalking mes-
sage to the database. Furthermore it should utilise statistical
methods like multivariate Gaussian distribution and PCA
to analyse the writeprint and profiles of cyberstalking, and
text mining to extract similar features, attacker behaviour,
greeting, farewell, etc., specifically between anonymous
messages and non anonymous ones.
Saving cyberstalking messages and evidence locally or
in a (private or shared) cloud is another function of the
evidence module. This process will allow law enforce-
ment to have regular access to messages as well as have an
overview of the cyberstalking progress. Saved cyberstalk-
ing messages could be a first step in collecting data on cy-
berstalking. However, saving data (evidence and emails) is
usually an optional function of the system, that would only
take place when the victim agrees with law enforcement
to save data so that law enforcement could have a regular
access and monitor cyberstalking incidents. The process
of saving cyberstalking messages, for instance, in a cloud
requires some safeguarding to preserve the messages’ in-
tegrity and authenticity and protect it from any malicious
act (which might destroy or manipulate potential evidence).
Hash functions like SHA could be utilised to make sure the
exchanged data is not modified during transmission or by
any unauthorised person. Furthermore, asymmetric keys
could be used for data encryption. Provided a suitable API
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Fig. 2 Identification module of the ACTS framework. The module comprises components for various relevant digital text forensics tasks that are
used to collect evidence against suspects
is available as well as corresponding legislation is in place
(e.g. Germany’s ‘quick freeze’ data retention approach2),
the evidence collection module could also notify the service
or content provider.
4 Digital text forensics for identification
An important part of our framework to detect cyberstalking
is the author identification module. Its purpose is the anal-
ysis of arriving messages with respect to authorship and
originality. Figure 2 gives an overview of its four major
components, namely attribution, verification, profiling, and
reuse detection. Each of these components is invoked un-
der specific circumstances, sometimes in parallel, to collect
evidence about the origin of a given message or a given
collection of messages. Its results are aggregated and then
returned to the surrounding framework. In what follows,
we briefly explain these components and their underlying
problem settings, we outline their relevance to detecting
cyberstalkers, and we point to state-of-the-art research for
each of them, much of which originates from a number of
shared task competitions that have been organized as part
of PAN workshop series on digital text forensics.3
2 This (controversially discussed) approach means data should be
stored only “under court order based on a probable cause” (see
also http://www.dw.com/en/germany-calls-for-a-quick-freeze-data-
compromise/a-15829029).
3 PAN is an excellence network and workshop series on digital text
forensics, where researchers and practitioners study technologies that
analyze texts with regard to originality, authorship, and trustworthi-
ness. Almost all of the technologies for corresponding tasks are still
in their infancy, and active research is required to push them forward.
PAN therefore focuses on the evaluation of selected tasks from the dig-
ital text forensics in order to develop large-scale, standardized bench-
marks, and to assess the state of the art. PAN has organized shared task
events since 2009. See also http://pan.webis.de.
For the detection and subsequent prosecution of cyber-
stalking, it is important to collect evidence on the suspect
perpetrators. The application of forensic software for au-
thor identification may aid in this respect by comparing
the messages received from a stalker with other pieces of
writing from a suspect, or that of a number of potential
suspects. In cases where the stalker attempts to stay anony-
mous, this may help in revealing their identity. However,
even if the stalker apparently acts openly, collecting evi-
dence that connects the stalker’s messages to the apparent
identity of the stalker is an important part of an investiga-
tion, since the stalker may try to deceive the investigators.
In this connection, technologies for authorship attribution
and verification are required to scale future investigations,
which, when given a text of unknown authorship, either at-
tribute it to the most likely author among a set of candidates,
or verify whether the text has been written by the same au-
thor as another given text. The former task corresponds to
a traditional task in forensic linguistics, where investiga-
tors first narrow down the set of candidates who may have
written a given piece of text using other evidence, and then
employ a forensic linguist to determine who of the candi-
dates probably wrote the text in question based on stylistic
analyses. This presumes of course that suspect candidates
can be identified and that sufficient writing samples from
each of them can be gathered. In that case, attribution boils
down to a multi-class classification problem, where each
suspect candidate corresponds to a class. By contrast, ver-
ification corresponds to a so-called one-class classification
problem [21, 35]: either a text has been written by a given
author (the target class), or not, whereas determining the
latter would mean to be able to accurately distinguish the
given author from all others. While being more challeng-
ing to solve automatically, verification problems may fre-
quently arise within cyberstalking detection. For exam-
ple, one may wish to check whether a message received
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from a given sender was indeed written by that sender by
verifying whether that message corresponds stylistically to
messages previously received from the same sender. Alto-
gether, attribution and verification address complementary
problem settings within cyberstalking detection.
In situations where little is known about the originator
of an offending message, however, neither attribution nor
verification technologies are of much use. Here, author pro-
filing technology can be applied to determine at least some
demographics about the author of the message in question.
Author profiling technology attempts to correlate writing
style with demographics, such as age, gender, region of
origin, mother tongue, personality, etc., which is typically
cast as a multi-class classification problem. This informa-
tion may help to narrow down the search for suspects. At
the same time, author profiling technology may also be used
to verify whether the supposed age of the sender of a stalk-
ing message is consistent with the results of an automatic
analysis, which may raise a flag, or serve as sufficient rea-
sons to doubt the obvious in an investigation. An analysis
of personality types may further allow for recommending
ways to deal with a supposed stalker in order not to encour-
age them further.
The automatic assessment of messages with respect to
authorship presumes that they have actually been written
by their senders. This assumption may not hold under all
circumstances; especially when offenders become aware of
the fact that their messages are being analyzed with re-
gard to writing style, they may attempt to obfuscate them.
While it is still unclear how well humans are capable of
adjusting their own writing style so that forensic software
or even a human forensic linguist are misled, an easy way
to send messages devoid of one’s own writing style is to
reuse someone else’s writing. This is why reuse detection
forms a integral part of forensic analysis, where the task
is to identify texts or text passages that have been reused,
and to retrieve their likely sources. Nevertheless, even in
the absence reference collections to compare a given mes-
sage with, a writing style analysis of a message may still be
useful, namely to identify writing style breaches (i.e., posi-
tions in a message where the writing style changes), which
would serve as evidence that texts from different authors
have been conflated [34].
All of the aforementioned authorship-related tasks, with
the exception of reuse detection, are basically addressed
using machine learning applied on top of stylometry, the
science of quantifying the writing style of texts. The first
application of stylometry to tackle an authorship dispute
dates back to the 19th century [24], and since then lin-
guists have proposed plenty of features for this task [17].
In general, such features attempt to capture writing style at
character level, at the lexical level, at the syntactic level,
at the semantic level, and dependent on the application.
It turns out, however, that low-level features at character
level, such as character n-grams, where n ranges from 2
to 4, are among the most effective ones, whereas tapping
syntactic or semantic information is less so and may serve
only as a complement. Character n-grams indeed carry var-
ious forms of stylistic information, including function word
usage, inflections, phonetic preferences, and even word and
sentence length distribution dependent on how often white
spaces and punctuation occur. Regarding the classifica-
tion technology applied, the outlined multi-class problems
make use of a straightforward classifier, whereas the one-
class classification problem of verification requires tailored
approaches. One of the best-performing ones includes the
reconstruction approach “Unmasking”, which trains a clas-
sifier to separate the text passages from the text of unknown
authorship from those of the known author, repeating the
training iteratively and removing the most discriminative
features in each iteration. The decrease of classification
performance over iterations is consistently higher if the
unknown text has in fact been written by a known au-
thor [22]. Besides these notable examples, there are plenty
more, many of which have been surveyed in [32]; both
for authorship attribution and verification, author profil-
ing as well as reuse detection, dozens of approaches have
been proposed over the past two decades. Yet, for all of
these tasks, little effort has been spent to develop stan-
dardised benchmarks, so that results can hardly be com-
pared across papers. To fill this gap, the PAN workshop
for digital text forensics has been initiated, where shared
tasks for all of the aforementioned problems have been
organised starting 2009. While a complete survey of the
results of the PAN initiative is out of the scope of this pa-
per, we refer to the latest overviews of the respective tasks,
namely for authorship attribution [19], authorship verifica-
tion [33], author profiling [28], and the two subtasks of
reuse detection, text alignment and source retrieval [15,
27]. These benchmarks have had a significant impact on
the community. In a recent large-scale reproducibility study
on authorship attribution, they were employed to reimple-
ment and reproduce the 15 most influential approaches from
the past two decades, evaluating them on the standardised
datasets [26]. The study finds that some of the approaches
proposed early on are still competitive with the most recent
contributions.
With respect to cyberstalking detection, there are still
open challenges in authorship identification that need to be
addressed, such as the fact that these technologies do not
work well on very short texts, unless many short text from
the same author can be gathered. If a stalker sends only
very short and only a few well-placed messages, a reliable
identification may be circumvented altogether. Moreover,
application-dependent style features need to be developed
that also take into account the context of the recipient.
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5 Conclusion and future work
Textual analysis and machine learning are cornerstones to-
wards a technical response to the problem of cyberstalking.
This is evident by the different prevention and mitigation
techniques discussed in this paper as well as the Anti Cy-
berstalking Text-based System (ACTS) framework. ACTS’
modules showcase various features to mitigate this type of
anti-social offence. By design, it has a prevention mecha-
nism combining the ability to detect, analyse, identify, and
block communication. Further, it also has an integrated
functionality to quarantine evidence to aid digital forensics
investigations. The forensic element of this framework is
not limited to logging content but adding a layer of analysis-
based metadata to establish relationships between collected
evidence, hence supporting investigation. In practice, this
capability is also critical to alarm and convince law-en-
forcement to the severity of the attack as it consequently
provides means to assess potential risk.
Our future work in this regard includes the development
of a new mechanism to empower users further with evi-
dence-based advice on how to respond to harassment. Vic-
tims usually have few choices 1) sending a reply to an un-
wanted message; 2) ignore it; or 3) outsource the response
to a third-party. Some of these actions include further de-
cisions such as deciding the content of the response in the
case of sending a reply or identifying a suitable third-party
to contact. We argue that machine learning can eventually
provide intelligence to guide users towards personalised
suitable actions. Accordingly, this ongoing work should
also survey existing experiences of victims to support such
a system.
Besides personalisation and content analysis, one of the
crucial elements of the ACTS framework relies on effective
authorship identification in a cyberstalking context. We
therefore discussed existing promising approaches for sev-
eral facets of this challenging task. It becomes clear that
the outcome of this line of research can potentially help to
detect cyberstalking more accurately. However, most of the
approaches have not directly been applied to the problem
of cyberstalking detection. Future efforts should therefore
focus on applying these mechanisms, potentially in the con-
text of ACTS, directly to the cyberstalking detection prob-
lem. One step in this direction could for instance be the
organization of a shared task on cyberstalking detection in
the context of PAN.
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